I Gusti Ngurah Rai (30 January 1917 – 20 November 1946) was an Indonesian military officer and participant in the Indonesian National Revolution. He was the founder and first commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces unit in the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the direct leader of armed anti-Dutch resistance in Bali. He was killed in November 1946 in a battle with Dutch troops near the village of Marga in central Bali.
A National Hero of Indonesia, he was posthumously awarded one of the country's highest military honours, the Star of Mahaputera, and promoted to the rank of brigadier general, having died with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is one of the most revered figures in Bali's modern history. I Gusti Ngurah Rai's name has been given to Denpasar's international airport, the island's largest university and largest stadium, a ship of the Indonesian Navy, streets in many Balinese settlements, and streets in several cities in other parts of Indonesia.
Early life and education
Ngurah Rai was born on 30 January 1917 in the village of Carangsari in Petang district, Badung Regency, southern Bali, into an affluent family of noble origin. He was the second of three sons of I Gusti Ngurah Palung (Indonesian: I Gusti Ngurah Palung) and his wife Ni Gusti Ayu Kompyang. At the time of Rai's birth, his father held the post of head of the Petang district administration.
Relatives and fellow villagers remembered Rai as a sociable and energetic child who enjoyed active games and the local form of the Indonesian martial art silat.
His father's official position and financial means allowed him to be sent to Denpasar to study at a Dutch elementary school for indigenous Indonesians, named HIS Denpasar. He then went to MULO Junior High School in Malang, East Java to continue his education at a Dutch secondary school. However, he did not complete his studies there. After his father's death in 1935, Ngurah Rai had to return to Bali.
After returning home, Ngurah Rai spent more than two years outside formal education and without regular employment, until in 1938 he entered the officer school of the Prajoda Corps, a paramilitary formation that had been established by the Dutch colonial administration in Bali shortly before, in 1936. Prajoda was not part of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL), and had the status of an auxiliary battalion-level unit responsible for maintaining order on the island and providing guards of honour during various official and ceremonial events. Its rank-and-file and non-commissioned personnel were recruited from the local population, mainly young men from aristocratic Balinese families; Dutch military personnel were appointed to senior officer posts, while junior officer posts were filled on a mixed basis.
At the Military Cadet School, which was located in Gianyar Regency in the south-eastern part of the island, Rai distinguished himself through good academic performance and independently studied several additional subjects, including English. Despite his small stature, even by the standards of a Balinese man in the first half of the 20th century; Rai was only 154 centimetres tall, and his weight did not exceed 45 kilograms even in later adulthood, he successfully coped with the physical demands of military training.
After graduating from the school with the rank of second lieutenant in 1940, Rai was sent to short-term officer courses in Magelang. In the same year, he was transferred for accelerated retraining to an artillery school at Corps Opleiding Voor Reserve Officieren (CORO) in Malang, a city already familiar to him from his earlier schooling.
Activities during the Second World War
In late 1941, after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific theatre, Ngurah Rai was recalled from Malang to serve in Prajoda. By the time of the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in January 1942, this auxiliary corps, numbering about 600 men, remained the only armed formation stationed on Bali, as there were no regular KNIL units on the island. Formal command of the corps was assigned to major general G. A. Ilgen, commander of the third infantry division of the KNIL, which was responsible for the defence of eastern Java, Bali and Madura. Its actual commander, however, was lieutenant colonel W. P. Roodenburg.
Despite the mobilisation measures that had been taken, Prajoda was unable to offer even minimal resistance to the Japanese, who made a surprise landing on Bali on 19 February 1942. The corps' units avoided contact with the enemy, mass desertion began, and the command's order to destroy the infrastructure of the Denpasar airfield to prevent its use by the enemy was not carried out. Under these circumstances, Roodenburg was forced to withdraw the remaining Prajoda troops from the Japanese landing area and formally disband the corps. The Balinese returned to their homes, while the Dutch officers fled to neighbouring Java, which at that time was still under KNIL control. Ngurah Rai is known to have helped two of his Dutch fellow servicemen cross to Java.
After the establishment of Japanese control over Bali, the island, like the entire Lesser Sunda island chain, was assigned to the occupation zone of the Second Fleet. Like many Indonesians, Ngurah Rai was initially relatively loyal toward the Japanese, associating their invasion, which had interrupted Dutch colonial rule, with the possibility of better development for the country and its political self-determination. He took a position at the Bali branch of the Japanese transport company Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, where he was involved in organising shipments of rice and other goods to Japan.
Over time, however, Ngurah Rai became convinced that the Japanese occupation had only worsened the situation of the Balinese population. By 1944, Rai's attitude toward the occupiers had become highly critical. He joined the anti-Japanese underground resistance that was taking shape in Bali during this period and began cooperating with the intelligence services of the Allies, which maintained a station in the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies. Heading an intelligence cell made up mainly of his former Prajoda comrades and subordinates, many of whom also worked at the local branch of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Rai supplied the Allies with information on the schedules and cargoes of Japanese transports. At one point, he came under suspicion and was detained by the Tokubetsu Keisatsutai, but was released after three days in custody due to a lack of evidence.
Alignment with the authorities of the Republic of Indonesia
After Japan's emperor officially announced the acceptance of the terms of surrender on 15 August 1945, followed two days later, on 17 August, by the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, spontaneous self-organisation began in Bali among supporters of the sovereignisation of the Dutch East Indies. By the end of August, several political groups had been formed, mainly youth organisations. With the arrival on the island of I Gusti Ketut Pudja, who had been appointed by President Sukarno as governor of the Lesser Sunda Islands province, with its capital in the Balinese city of Singaraja, republican authorities gradually began to take shape there. A significant part of the Balinese feudal nobility adopted a wait-and-see position during this period, fearing the imminent return of the Dutch colonial authorities to the island. Ngurah Rai, however, immediately came out in support of independence. Establishing close cooperation with Ketut Pudja, he began creating military-police forces on the island intended to resist the restoration of Dutch rule.
At the same time, Ngurah Rai warned his supporters, many of whom came from the lower strata of Balinese society, against conflict with the aristocratic elite, believing that any form of class conflict would weaken the country's capacity in the struggle for independence. At the same time, owing to his own background, he retained the ability to communicate with the highest-ranking Balinese, including many rulers of local princely dynasties, and urged them to remain loyal to the republican authorities.
After the creation in October 1945, by decree of President Sukarno, of the People's Security Army (Indonesian: Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR), which became the precursor of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the militia formed by Ngurah Rai, which by that time consisted of 13 companies, was declared by Governor Ketut Pudja to be one of its structural units. Rai himself was unanimously elected commander of the "TKR troops in the Lesser Sunda Islands" at a special meeting attended by the governor, the heads of all major political groups, and representatives of most Balinese princely houses. The headquarters of these troops was established in Denpasar. In November 1945, Ngurah Rai's authority was confirmed by a delegation of the highest republican military command that visited Bali, and he was granted the rank of major in the TKR. To maintain liaison between the provincial and central military structures, an officer from the TKR general staff was attached to Rai, while a representative of Rai was, in turn, sent to the general staff. At the same time, despite the concentration of most armed resources under Rai's command, there remained armed pro-independence groups in Bali that were outside his control, mainly small combat detachments of youth organisations.
The troops of capitulated Japan that remained in Bali during this period, whose personnel then numbered 3,136 men, including 1,900 army servicemen and 1,146 sailors, initially did not obstruct the activities of Ngurah Rai and his militia, or those of other representatives of the republican authorities. Moreover, a considerable number of Japanese sympathised with anti-Dutch Balinese. There were cases of Japanese military personnel voluntarily handing over weapons and material assets to local supporters of independence, and even joining the Indonesian republicans with their weapons. Several dozen Japanese are reliably known to have joined the anti-Dutch movement in Bali. In late November 1945, the command of Japanese forces in Bali entered into negotiations with emissaries of Sukarno's government over the transfer of most of its weapons to the latter.
In early December 1945, however, under pressure from the command of the British expeditionary force, which had begun disarming and evacuating Japanese units from Indonesia, the Japanese demanded that Bali's republican leadership return the financial assets that had been expropriated from them. Governor Ketut Pudja regarded this demand as unacceptable and provocative. At the same time, the leadership of local youth groups, aware of the negotiations between representatives of the central authorities and the Japanese, supported the independent confiscation of Japanese weapons so that they would remain in Bali rather than be transported to Java.
On 13 December, a republican detachment attacked the Japanese garrison in Denpasar, but suffered casualties in a brief engagement and was dispersed. Ngurah Rai's role in this event remains a matter of debate. The Canadian historian Geoffrey Robinson, author of a major study of this period in Balinese history, argues that the military operation was carried out on the orders of the republican governor, and that Rai therefore could not have been uninvolved in its preparation. By contrast, the Indonesian journalists Iwan Santosa and Wenri Wanhar, drawing on the recollections of participants in the events, concluded that the attack on the Japanese garrison in Denpasar had been undertaken independently by youth movement activists who were not serving in Ngurah Rai's formation. In any case, after the events of 13 December, the attitude of the Japanese toward the Balinese independence fighters, and toward Rai personally, changed sharply and became openly hostile. They arrested Governor Ketut Pudja and several republican activists, and resumed patrols of the area, which had been suspended after Japan's surrender was announced. Negotiations on the transfer of weapons to the Jakarta emissaries were broken off.
The events in Denpasar convinced Ngurah Rai that armed confrontation with the Japanese was counterproductive. He ordered the militia forces to withdraw from Denpasar and other major settlements in Bali in order to avoid further clashes with the occupation troops. He also succeeded in dissuading one of the Balinese princes from declaring war on the Japanese. Rai urged him, as he did other supporters of independence, to preserve their strength for the struggle against the Dutch, who by that time had already announced their intention to restore their control over the colony. Rai then decided to travel to Java, to the general staff of the People's Security Army in Yogyakarta, in order to request weapons from Indonesia's senior military leadership and seek instructions on further action. Together with a small group of associates who, like him, held officer ranks in the People's Security Army, he left Bali on 1 January 1946.
Stay in Java
By the time Ngurah Rai arrived in Yogyakarta on 13 January 1946, the central Javanese city had been declared the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, as the republican authorities had lost control of Jakarta, where the Dutch colonial administration had been restored with the support of British troops. The leadership of the general staff, and its chief Oerip Soemohardjo personally, highly praised the enthusiasm and fighting spirit of the Balinese officer. In Yogyakarta, Rai was introduced to President Sukarno, who by that time had already heard of his active work. According to eyewitnesses, the Indonesian leader was charmed by the small stature of the commander of the Balinese military formation.
The militia created by Rai was finally integrated into the structure of the national armed forces. On 1 February, it was officially incorporated as a regiment into the VII Division of the Army of the Republic of Indonesia, which was then being formed in East Java. Funding was allocated for the Lesser Sunda Islands Regiment from the national military budget, amounting to 70,000 rupiahs per month, and the autonomous status of this military unit was also specifically provided for. Rai himself was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel.
At the same time, Ngurah Rai's request for arms supplies was rejected by the leadership of the general staff, on the grounds that all the weapons and ammunition at its disposal had already been allocated to other military units. A decision was made to send to Bali, in support of Rai's regiment, a fully manned and armed unit from Java. The preparation of this reinforcement was entrusted to the command of the national naval forces, and its core consisted of the naval special unit then being formed, "M Force", under the command of Captain Markadi. Rai himself was instructed to take part in the preparation of this unit, in particular by familiarising its fighters with the specific features of the Balinese theatre of operations. As a result, his stay in Java lasted until early April 1946.
Meanwhile, during Rai's trip to Java, the situation in Bali was changing rapidly. As early as January, representatives of the Dutch colonial authorities began arriving on the island accompanied by British military personnel. Under pressure from the British and the pro-Dutch section of the local feudal elite, Governor Ketut Pudja was forced to transfer most of his authority to the Council of Princes, formed on 29 January, almost all of whose members viewed the prospect of the restoration of Dutch colonial rule favourably. In early March 1946, a two-thousand-strong expeditionary force, formed mainly from KNIL servicemen released from Japanese captivity, landed on the island. It was given the name "Red Elephant". Within a week, the colonial administration had been re-established in Bali, and the local republican authorities were deposed.
Initially, relations between the Dutch and supporters of independence in Bali were largely free of conflict. The latter's leaders officially renounced any subversive activity, thereby avoiding persecution by the colonial authorities. Ngurah Rai's regiment, left without its commander, was not formally disbanded, but its units were forced to leave populated areas: the fighters set up camps in the jungle, while some returned to their homes. By mid-March, however, regular clashes had begun to occur on the island between Dutch troops and the local population. Even the commander of the "Red Elephant", Lieutenant Colonel Frederik Hendrik ter Meulen, acknowledged that in most cases the violence was caused by excessive suspicion on the part of the expeditionary corps' personnel and by abuses of authority. In his report to higher command, he noted that in the first week of April alone, corps personnel had killed more than 50 islanders, a considerable number of whom, including a woman and a child, were later found to have had no connection with anti-colonial resistance. Despite a categorical ban by the Allied British-Dutch command on the use of military aviation in Bali and neighbouring Lombok, there were numerous cases in which junior personnel of the "Red Elephant" used B-25 and Piper Cub aircraft on their own initiative to strafe and bomb "suspicious" gatherings of people and villages.
Under these conditions, the leadership of the Indonesian armed forces accelerated preparations for the deployment of units to Bali. By early April, the formation of "M Force" had been completed, and Ngurah Rai was ordered to lead the landing of its advance units. On the night of 4 April, three groups of fighters, numbering about 160 men in total, set out on tugboats and fishing boats from the East Javanese port of Banyuwangi toward Bali. Two groups, including the one directly led by Ngurah Rai, succeeded in landing without obstruction on the north-western coast of Bali the following morning. The third, led by the commander of "M Force", Captain Markadi, was intercepted in the Bali Strait by a Dutch LCM-6 landing craft and engaged it in a battle that entered history as the first naval battle of the Indonesian armed forces. Markadi's group, after suffering losses, also eventually landed on Bali.
In total, during the operation, which lasted several days, 290 fighters from "M Force" were transferred from East Java to Bali. In addition, small groups of servicemen from other units, as well as volunteers from Java, Madura and other parts of Indonesia, landed on the island. According to Dutch intelligence, in the first half of April 1946 at least 400 armed supporters of independence arrived in Bali from East Java, to oppose the approximately 2,000 Dutch troops who had landed on 2 and 3 March 1946.
Military operations against the Dutch
Consolidation of anti-Dutch forces
By the time Ngurah Rai returned to Bali, most of the remaining fighters of his regiment were encamped in the mountainous area near the settlement of Munduk Malang in the central part of the island, on the border between Tabanan and Gianyar regencies. He went there after landing, accompanied by a small part of "M Force". The remaining fighters of "M Force" were divided into several groups, which moved to other parts of the island to conduct reconnaissance and organise guerrilla activity.
Rai and his detachment moved covertly and with great caution, so the journey to Munduk Malang took almost two weeks. During this period, the situation on the island became still more tense, and a series of clashes took place between supporters of independence and Dutch troops. The most significant confrontations occurred on 10 April in Denpasar near the barracks of the Dutch garrison, and on 15 April in the village of Penebel in Tabanan Regency, where a republican detachment attacked a police post.
Arriving at Munduk Malang on 16 April, Ngurah Rai ordered his fighters to refrain from armed clashes with the Dutch. Following a directive from the supreme command, he concentrated his efforts on uniting the forces of Balinese supporters of independence. On his first day at Munduk Malang, he met the leaders of the two main republican groups active on the island, who had arrived there: the local branches of the organisations Youth of the Republic of Indonesia (PRI) and Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo), each of which had its own combat detachments. Following the meeting between Rai and the youth leaders, the creation of a unified political body was proclaimed: the Indonesian People's Struggle Council of the Lesser Sunda Islands (Indonesian: Dewan Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia Sunda Kecil), which also became known in Bali by the shortened name "Struggle Council". A Joint Headquarters (Indonesian: Markas Besar Umum) was formed as the Council's military command body. Ngurah Rai was elected chairman of the Council and, at the same time, head of the Joint Headquarters. This combination of posts allowed him to concentrate under his authority the leadership of all military and civilian formations of the Balinese republicans.
Using his expanded authority, Rai ordered almost all the forces under his control to be drawn to Munduk Malang. It was decided to leave only six very small detachments in the other parts of the island. In addition, most of the fighters of "M Force", which had arrived from Java, continued to operate outside the main base at Munduk Malang. By the end of May 1946, Ngurah Rai had managed to gather about 1,500 people in the camp near Munduk Malang, some of whom were women and adolescents. The great majority had no combat experience or military training, and firearms were available to no more than half of the fighters. There were several Japanese mortars and heavy machine guns, but ammunition stocks were limited. Not all members of the Joint Headquarters supported Rai's idea of creating such a large guerrilla formation. Many proposed dividing the available forces into small detachments that could operate with greater mobility and secrecy under guerrilla conditions. However, there were no breaches of the principle of unity of command: Ngurah Rai's authority was recognised unconditionally, and his orders were duly carried out.
At the same time, Rai continued to maintain active contacts with representatives of the Balinese feudal nobility, coordinating with them on tactics toward the Dutch. He is known to have persuaded some of his acquaintances who sympathised with the republican movement to accept posts in the administrative structures being created by the colonial authorities, so that they could later provide covert assistance to the independence fighters.
The Long March to Mount Agung
The Dutch monitored Ngurah Rai's mobilisation activity and set up several military posts near his base at Munduk Malang, but also refrained from military action. Moreover, the command of the "Red Elephant", which included many officers who had personally known Rai from his pre-war service in Prajoda, including the contingent commander himself, Lieutenant Colonel ter Meulen, hoped to persuade the republican commander to abandon the confrontation. On 13 May 1946, a staff officer of the "Red Elephant", Captain J. B. T. Konig, one of the two officers whom Rai had helped to cross from Japanese-attacked Bali to Java in February 1942, sent him, both personally and on behalf of the contingent commander, a courteous and respectful message urging him to enter into negotiations.
Denpasar, 13 May 1946
High-born Rai,
We, Lieutenant Colonel ter Meulen and I (you certainly remember us), are well aware of the reasons that compelled you to lead a unit of the People's Security Army. We would very much like to speak with you. Please try to make contact with Captain Cassa near the village of Plaga; later, we could speak there. After our talks, you may make any decision at your own discretion.
J. B. T. Konig,
Captain of the land forces
Rai's reply, which soon reached the Dutch, was addressed solely to ter Meulen. The partisan commander's message entered the annals of Indonesian history under the name "Sacred Letter" and is widely popularised as an expression of courage and patriotism.
18 May 1946
To the honourable Lieutenant Colonel Ter Meulen
in Denpasar
FREEDOM!
Your letter has been safely received by us. Briefly, we give the following reply:
The question of security in Bali is our affair. Since the landing of your troops, the island has become insecure. The proof of this is already clear and can no longer be denied. Look, the suffering of the people is worsening. The safety of the people is threatened. In addition, economic disorder is tightening around the people's neck like a noose.
Security is threatened because you have violated the will of the people, who have already very clearly proclaimed their independence.
The question of negotiations we leave to the competence of our leaders in Java. Bali is not the place for diplomatic negotiations. And I do not compromise. In the name of the people, I stand for the departure of the Dutch from the island of Bali. Otherwise, we are able and promise to continue fighting until our aims are achieved.
As long as you remain in Bali, the island of Bali will remain a vessel of bloody battles between us and your side. That is all. Please take note.
Once free, forever free.
On behalf of the Bali Struggle Council
Leader:
I Gusti Ngurah Rai
In late May, the commander of "M Force", Captain Markadi, arrived at Munduk Malang with a group of 25 of his fighters and, citing a recent report from the general staff, informed Ngurah Rai of a planned large-scale landing of Indonesian troops on the western coast of Bali. On 1 June 1946, Rai ordered the entire unit he had formed to move to eastern Bali, to the area of the island's highest mountain, the volcano Mount Agung. The reasoning behind this decision remains unclear. Ngurah Rai did not announce any further plan of action, promising his associates that he would decide according to circumstances during the movement. The most common assumption is that by moving east he intended to draw Dutch attention away from the western part of the island, in order to create favourable conditions for the landing of republican forces from Java announced by Markadi.
The 200-kilometre march of the 1,500-strong detachment through the mountain jungle, which took more than a month and became known in Indonesian historiography as the "Long March to Mount Agung", proved highly difficult from a logistical and organisational standpoint. It was also accompanied by a series of engagements with Dutch troops, the intensity of which gradually increased. At the foot of Mount Agung, Rai's forces were subjected for several days to mortar fire and air strikes, in which the Dutch used B-25 bombers. On reaching the village of Tanah Aron on the western slope of the mountain on 7 June, they entered into battle with enemy units numbering about 200 men.