The Battle of Trafalgar was a fleet action which took place on 21 October 1805 between the Royal Navy and a combined fleet of the French and Spanish navies during the War of the Third Coalition. As part of Napoleon's planned invasion of the United Kingdom, the French and Spanish navies planned to take control of the English Channel and provide the French invasion army with safe passage to Britain. The allied fleet, under the command of French Vice-admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve, sailed from the port of Cádiz in southern Spain on 18 October 1805. It encountered a British fleet under Vice-Admiral of the White Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson in the Atlantic Ocean along the southwest coast of Spain off Cape Trafalgar.
Nelson's fleet was outnumbered, having only 27 ships of the line to the 33 of Villeneuve's fleet which included the largest warship in either fleet, the Spanish ship of the line Santísima Trinidad. To address this imbalance, Nelson sailed his fleet directly at the allied battle line's flank in two columns, hoping to break the line into pieces. Villeneuve had worried that Nelson might attempt this tactic, but for various reasons, failed to prepare for it. The crews of the French and Spanish ships were also inexperienced and poorly trained. The British plan worked almost perfectly; Nelson's columns split the Franco-Spanish fleet in three, isolating the rear from Villeneuve's flagship, Bucentaure. The allied vanguard sailed ahead while attempting to turn back, leaving the British temporarily superior in number against the remainder of the allied fleet. In the battle that followed, 18 allied ships were captured or destroyed, while the British lost none.
The offensive exposed the leading British ships to intense crossfire as they approached the Franco-Spanish lines. Nelson's own HMS Victory led the front column and was almost knocked out of action. Nelson was shot by a French musketeer during the battle, and died shortly before it ended. Villeneuve was captured along with his flagship Bucentaure. He later attended Nelson's state funeral while a captive on parole in Britain. After the battle, the senior surviving Spanish commander, Admiral Federico Gravina, led part of the surviving Franco-Spanish fleet away from the storm; he died six months later of wounds sustained during the battle.
Nelson's victory against the odds and death during battle secured his place as a British national hero. His signal to the fleet shortly before the battle, "England expects that every man will do his duty", is regularly quoted and paraphrased. The victory confirmed Britain's naval supremacy and was achieved in part through Nelson's departure from prevailing naval tactical orthodoxy. Although the battle led to the definitive end of French plans to invade Britain, it had a limited impact on the War of the Third Coalition, which ended a few months later in defeat for Britain and her allies. The Napoleonic Wars would continue for another decade.
Background
In 1805, the First French Empire, under Napoleon Bonaparte, was the dominant military land power on the European continent, while the British Royal Navy controlled the seas. During the course of the war, the British imposed a naval blockade on France, which affected trade and kept the French from fully mobilising their naval resources. Despite several successful evasions of the blockade by the French navy, it failed to inflict a major defeat upon the British, who were able to attack French interests at home and abroad with relative ease.
When the Third Coalition declared war on France, after the short-lived Peace of Amiens, Napoleon renewed his determination to invade Britain. To allow his invasion flotilla to reach England, he needed to wrest control of the English Channel from the Royal Navy.
The main French fleets were at Brest in Brittany and at Toulon on the Mediterranean coast. Other ports on the French Atlantic coast harboured smaller squadrons. France and Spain were allied, so the Spanish fleet based in Cádiz and Ferrol was also available.
The British possessed an experienced and well-trained corps of naval officers. By contrast, some of the best officers in the French navy had been executed or had left the service during the early part of the French Revolution.
Vice-admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve had taken command of the French Mediterranean Squadron following the death of Vice-admiral Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville. There had been more competent officers, but they had either been employed elsewhere or had fallen from Napoleon's favour. Villeneuve had shown a distinct reluctance for facing the Royal Navy after the French defeat at the Battle of the Nile in 1798.
Napoleon's naval plan in 1805 was for the French and Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean and Cádiz to break through the blockade and join forces in the Caribbean. They would then return, assist the fleet in Brest to emerge from the blockade, and together clear the English Channel of Royal Navy ships, ensuring a safe passage for the invasion barges.
Pursuit of Villeneuve
Early in 1805, Vice-Admiral of the White Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson commanded the British fleet blockading the Mediterranean port of Toulon. Unlike William Cornwallis, who maintained a close blockade off Brest with the Channel Fleet, Nelson adopted a loose blockade in hope of luring the French out to battle, saying, "to be able to get at the enemy you must let them come out to you, if you cannot get at them." However, Villeneuve's fleet successfully evaded Nelson's when the British were blown off station by storms. Nelson commenced a search of the Mediterranean, supposing that the French intended to make for Egypt, but Villeneuve instead took his fleet through the Strait of Gibraltar, rendezvoused with the Spanish fleet in Cádiz, and sailed as planned for the Caribbean. Once Nelson realised that the French were crossing the Atlantic, he set off in pursuit. He missed them by just days in the West Indies as a result of false information.
Cádiz
Having lured the British to the West Indies, Villeneuve returned from the Caribbean to Europe, intending to break the blockade at Brest. Nelson, still in fear for Egypt, made to return to the Mediterranean. The fast sailing corvette taking word of his plans back to the admiralty spotted the French heading further north. On receiving this intelligence Lord Barham immediately ordered Admiral Cornwallis to combine his squadron with that of Vice-Admiral Robert Calder off Ferrol and to stretch out thirty to forty leagues into the Atlantic to block the French from entering the Channel.
Calder intercepted the French resulting in an inconclusive engagement during the Battle of Cape Finisterre in which two of the Spanish ships were captured. Villeneuve abandoned his plan and sailed back to Ferrol in northern Spain. There he received orders from Napoleon to return to Brest according to the main plan.
Napoleon's invasion plans for Britain depended on having a sufficiently large number of ships of the line protecting his port of Boulogne on the English Channel. This would require Villeneuve's force of 33 ships to join Vice-Admiral Honoré Joseph Antoine Ganteaume's fleet of 21 ships at Brest, along with a squadron of five ships under Captain Allemand, which would have given him a combined force of 59 ships of the line.
When Villeneuve set sail from Ferrol on 10 August, he was under orders from Napoleon to sail northward toward Brest. Instead, he worried that the British were observing his manoeuvres, so on 11 August, he sailed southward towards Cádiz on the southwestern coast of Spain. With no sign of Villeneuve's fleet, on 25 August, the three French army corps' invasion force near Boulogne broke camp and marched into Germany, where it was later engaged. This ended the immediate threat of invasion.
The same month, Admiral Lord Nelson returned home to Britain after two years of duty at sea. He remained ashore for 25 days and was warmly received by his countrymen. Word reached Britain on 2 September about the combined French and Spanish fleet in Cádiz harbour. Nelson had to wait until 15 September before his ship, HMS Victory, was ready to sail.
On 15 August, Cornwallis decided to detach 20 ships of the line from the fleet guarding the English Channel to sail southward to engage the French and Spanish forces in Spain, leaving the Channel with only 11 ships of the line. The detached force formed the nucleus of the British fleet at Trafalgar. This fleet, under Calder's command, reached Cádiz on 15 September. Nelson joined the fleet on 28 September to take command.
Hoping to lure the combined Franco-Spanish force out from Cádiz harbour and engage it in a decisive battle, Nelson kept his main force out of sight approximately 50 miles (80 km) offshore and sent a squadron of frigates (faster, but too small for the line of battle) to keep watch on the harbour. This was led by Captain Blackwood aboard HMS Euryalus, with five frigates, a schooner, and a brig.
Supply situation
Nelson's fleet badly needed provisioning. On 2 October, five ships of the line, HMS Queen, Canopus, Spencer, Zealous, Tigre, and the frigate HMS Endymion were dispatched to Gibraltar under Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis for supplies.
These ships were later diverted for convoy duty in the Mediterranean, although Nelson had expected them to return. Similarly, HMS Superb under Captain Richard Goodwin Keats had been sent to the dockyard for a re-fit after four years at sea, including the chase of Villeneuve, and was expected to return to the fleet where Keats was to be Nelson's second, but the ship was not released in time. Other British ships continued to arrive, and by 15 October the fleet was up to full strength for the battle. Nelson also lost Calder's flagship, the 98-gun Prince of Wales, which he sent home as Calder had been recalled by the Admiralty to face a court-martial for his apparent lack of aggression during the engagement off Cape Finisterre on 22 July.
Meanwhile, Villeneuve's fleet in Cádiz was also suffering from a serious supply shortage that could not be easily rectified by the cash-poor French. The blockade maintained by the British fleet had made it difficult for the Franco-Spanish allies to obtain stores, and their ships were ill-equipped. Villeneuve's ships were also more than two thousand men short of the force needed to sail. These were not the only problems faced by the Franco-Spanish fleet. The main French ships of the line had been kept in harbour for years by the British blockade with only brief sorties. The French crews included few experienced sailors, and, as most of the crew had to be taught the elements of seamanship on the few occasions when they got to sea, gunnery was neglected. The hasty voyage across the Atlantic and back used up vital supplies. Villeneuve's supply situation began to improve in October, but news of Nelson's arrival made Villeneuve reluctant to leave port. His captains had held a vote on the matter and decided to stay in harbour.
On 16 September, Napoleon gave orders for the French and Spanish ships at Cádiz to put to sea at the first favourable opportunity, join with seven Spanish ships of the line then at Cartagena, go to Naples and land the soldiers they carried to reinforce his troops there, then fight decisively if they met a numerically inferior British fleet.
Fleets
British
On 21 October, Admiral Nelson had 27 ships of the line with 2148 cannons, and a total of 17000 crewmen and marines under his command. Nelson's flagship, HMS Victory, captained by Thomas Masterman Hardy, was one of three 100-gun first-rates in his fleet. He also had four 98-gun second-rates and 20 third-rates. One of the third-rates was an 80-gun vessel, and 16 were 74-gun vessels. The remaining three were 64-gun ships, which were being phased out of the Royal Navy at the time of the battle. Nelson also had four frigates of 38 or 36 guns, a 12-gun schooner and a 10-gun cutter.
Franco-Spanish
Against Nelson, Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, sailing on his flagship Bucentaure, fielded 33 ships of the line, including some of the largest in the world at the time. The Spanish contributed four first-rates to the fleet – three of these ships, one at 130 guns (Santísima Trinidad) and two at 112 guns (Príncipe de Asturias, Santa Ana), were much larger than anything under Nelson's command. The fourth first-rate carried 100 guns. The fleet had six 80-gun third-rates (four French and two Spanish), and one Spanish 64-gun third-rate. The remaining 22 third-rates were 74-gun vessels, of which 14 were French and eight Spanish. In total, the Spanish contributed 15 ships of the line and the French 18 along with some 30000 men and marines manning 2632 cannons. The fleet also included five 40-gun frigates and two 18-gun brigs, all French.
Prelude
Nelson's plan
The prevailing tactical orthodoxy at the time involved manoeuvring to approach the enemy fleet in a single line of battle and then engaging broadside in parallel lines. In previous times, fleets had usually engaged in a mixed mêlée of chaotic one-on-one battles. One reason for the development of the line of battle formation was to facilitate control of the fleet: if all the ships were in line, signalling during battle became possible. The line also allowed either side to disengage by breaking away in formation; if the opponent chose to continue, their line would be broken as well. This often led to inconclusive battles, or allowed the losing side to minimise its losses. Facing a numerically superior Franco-Spanish line, Nelson wanted to break it into a chaotic mêlée which would force his opponents to fight his well-trained crews ship to ship.
Nelson's solution was to cut the opposing line in three. Approaching in two columns sailing perpendicular to the Franco-Spanish fleet's line, one towards the centre of the opposing line and one towards the trailing end, his ships would surround the middle third, and force them to fight to the end. Nelson hoped specifically to cut the line just in front of the French flagship, Bucentaure; the isolated ships in front of the break would not be able to see the flagship's signals, which he hoped would take them out of combat while they re-formed. This echoed the tactics used by Admiral Duncan at the Battle of Camperdown and Admiral Jervis at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, both in 1797.
The plan had three principal advantages:
First, the British fleet would close with the Franco-Spanish as quickly as possible, preventing their escape.
Second, it would quickly bring on a mêlée and frantic battle by breaking the Franco-Spanish line and inducing a series of individual ship-to-ship actions, in which the British knew they were likely to prevail. Nelson knew that the superior seamanship, faster gunnery and better morale of his crews were great advantages.
Third, it would bring a decisive concentration on the rear of the Franco-Spanish fleet. The ships in the van of the French and Spanish fleet would have to turn back to support the rear, which would take a long time. Additionally, once the line had been broken, their ships would be relatively defenceless against powerful broadsides from the British fleet, and it would take them a long time to reposition to return fire.
The main drawback of attacking head-on was that as the leading British ships approached, the Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet would be able to direct raking broadside fire at their bows, to which they would be unable to reply. To lessen the time the fleet was exposed to this danger, Nelson had his ships make all available sail (including stunsails), yet another departure from the norm. He was also well aware that French and Spanish gunners were ill-trained and would have difficulty firing accurately from a moving gun platform. The Combined Fleet was sailing across a heavy swell, causing the ships to roll heavily and exacerbate the problem. Nelson's plan was a carefully calculated gamble.
During the blockade off the coast of Spain in October, Nelson instructed his captains, over two dinners aboard Victory, on his plan for the approaching battle. In an animated conversation with his favourite captain, Richard Goodwin Keats, who was expected to be his second in the forthcoming battle, Nelson explained a refined battle plan whilst the two were walking in the garden of Merton in August 1805. The order of sailing, in which the fleet was arranged when the opposing fleet was first sighted, was to be the order of the ensuing action so that no time would be wasted in forming two lines. The first, led by his second-in-command Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, was to sail into the rear of the Franco-Spanish line, while the other, led by Nelson, was to sail into the centre and vanguard. In preparation for the battle, Nelson ordered the ships of his fleet to be painted in a distinctive yellow and black pattern (later known as the Nelson Chequer) that would make them easy to distinguish from their opponents.
Nelson was careful to point out that something had to be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea battle, so he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short, circumstances would dictate the execution, subject to the guiding rule that the Franco-Spanish fleet's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the line.
Admiral Villeneuve himself expressed his belief that Nelson would use some sort of unorthodox attack, presciently speculating that Nelson would drive right at his line. But his long game of cat and mouse with Nelson had worn him down, and he was suffering from a loss of nerve. Fearing that his inexperienced officers would be unable to maintain formation in more than one group, he chose to keep the single line that became Nelson's target.
Departure
The Combined Fleet of French and Spanish warships anchored in Cádiz under the leadership of Admiral Villeneuve was in disarray. On 16 September 1805 Villeneuve received orders from Napoleon to sail the Combined Fleet from Cádiz to Naples. At first, Villeneuve was optimistic about returning to the Mediterranean, but soon had second thoughts. A war council was held aboard his flagship, Bucentaure, on 8 October. While some of the French captains wished to obey Napoleon's orders, the Spanish captains and other French officers, including Villeneuve, thought it best to remain in Cádiz. Villeneuve changed his mind yet again on 18 October 1805, ordering the Combined Fleet to sail immediately even though there were only very light winds.
The sudden change was prompted by a letter Villeneuve had received on 18 October, informing him that Vice-Admiral François Rosily had arrived in Madrid with orders to take command of the Combined Fleet. Stung by the prospect of being disgraced before the fleet, Villeneuve resolved to go to sea before his successor could reach Cádiz. At the same time, he received intelligence that a detachment of six British ships (Admiral Louis' squadron), had docked at Gibraltar, thus weakening the British fleet. This was used as the pretext for sudden change.
The weather, however, suddenly turned calm following a week of gales. This slowed the progress of the fleet leaving the harbour, giving the British plenty of warning. Villeneuve had drawn up plans to form a force of four squadrons, each containing both French and Spanish ships. Following their earlier vote on 8 October to stay put, some captains were reluctant to leave Cádiz, and as a result they failed to follow Villeneuve's orders closely and the fleet straggled out of the harbour in no particular formation.
It took most of 20 October for Villeneuve to get his fleet organised; it eventually set sail in three columns for the Straits of Gibraltar to the southeast. That same evening, Achille spotted a force of 18 British ships of the line in pursuit. The fleet began to prepare for battle and during the night, they were ordered into a single line. The following day, Nelson's fleet of 27 ships of the line and four frigates was spotted in pursuit from the northwest with the wind behind it. Villeneuve again ordered his fleet into three columns, but soon changed his mind and restored a single line. The result was a sprawling, uneven formation.
At 5:40 a.m. on 21 October, the British were about 21 miles (34 km) to the northwest of Cape Trafalgar, with the Franco-Spanish fleet between the British and the Cape. About 6 a.m., Nelson gave the order to prepare for battle. At 8 a.m., the British frigate Euryalus, which had been keeping watch on the Combined Fleet overnight, observed the British fleet still "forming the lines" in which it would attack.
At 8 a.m., Villeneuve ordered the fleet to wear together (turn about) and return to Cádiz. This reversed the order of the allied line, placing the rear division under Rear-Admiral Pierre Dumanoir le Pelley in the vanguard. The wind became contrary at this point, often shifting direction. The very light wind rendered manoeuvring virtually impossible for all but the most expert seamen. The inexperienced crews had difficulty with the changing conditions, and it took nearly an hour and a half for Villeneuve's order to be completed. The French and Spanish fleet now formed an uneven, angular crescent, with the slower ships generally to leeward and closer to the shore.
By 11 a.m., Nelson's entire fleet was visible to Villeneuve, drawn up in two parallel columns. The two fleets would be within range of each other within an hour. Villeneuve was concerned at this point about forming up a line, as his ships were unevenly spaced in an irregular formation drawn out nearly 5 miles (8 km) long as Nelson's fleet approached.
As the British drew closer, they could see that the combined French and Spanish fleet was not sailing in a tight order, but in irregular groups. Nelson could not immediately make out the French flagship as the French and Spanish were not flying command pennants.
Nelson was outnumbered and outgunned, with the opposing fleet totalling nearly 30000 men and 2568 guns to Nelson's 17000 men and 2148 guns. The Franco-Spanish fleet also had six more ships of the line, and so could more readily combine their fire. There was no way for some of Nelson's ships to avoid being "doubled on" or even "trebled on".
As the two fleets drew closer, anxiety began to build among officers and sailors; one British sailor described the approach thus:
During this momentous preparation, the human mind had ample time for meditation and conjecture, for it was evident that the fate of England rested on this battle.
Battle
Commencement
The battle progressed largely according to Nelson's plan. At 11:45, Nelson sent the flag signal, "England expects that every man will do his duty".
His Lordship came to me on the poop, and after ordering certain signals to be made, about a quarter to noon, he said, "Mr. Pasco, I wish to say to the fleet, 'England confides that every man will do his duty'" and he added "You must be quick, for I have one more to make which is for close action." I replied, "If your Lordship will permit me to substitute 'expects' for 'confides' the signal will soon be completed, because the word 'expects' is in the vocabulary, and 'confides' must be spelt," His Lordship replied, in haste, and with seeming satisfaction, "That will do, Pasco, make it directly."
The term "England" was widely used at the time to refer to the United Kingdom; the British fleet included significant contingents from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Unlike the photographic depiction above, this signal would have been shown on the mizzen mast only and would have required 12 lifts.