On 1 January 2024, at 16:10:09 JST (07:10:09 UTC), a MJMA7.6 (Mw7.5) earthquake struck 6 km (3.7 mi) north-northeast of Suzu, located on the Noto Peninsula of Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan. The reverse-faulting shock achieved a maximum JMA seismic intensity of Shindo 7 and Modified Mercalli intensity of X–XI (Extreme). The shaking and accompanying tsunami caused widespread destruction on the Noto Peninsula, particularly in the towns of Suzu, Wajima, Noto and Anamizu. Damage was also recorded in Toyama and Niigata prefectures.
There were 732 deaths confirmed and two people remain missing. At least 718 fatalities occurred in Ishikawa, 8 in Toyama and 6 more in Niigata. The mainshock also injured more than 1,400 people and damaged 204,903 structures across nine prefectures. Of these, 228 deaths were directly attributed to the earthquake, and the other 504 were disaster-related deaths aggravated by fear of aftershocks, electricity and water outages and evacuations to temporary shelters and other locations. It was the deadliest earthquake in Japan since the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake.
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) officially named this earthquake the 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake (Japanese: 令和6年能登半島地震, Hepburn: Reiwa 6-nen Noto-hantō Jishin). It led to Japan's first major tsunami warning since the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, and a tsunami of 11.3 m (37 ft) was measured in Wajima on the peninsula.

Tectonic setting
Overview
Noto Peninsula lies on the southeastern margin of the Sea of Japan, which was formed by back-arc rifting related to subduction of the Pacific plate beneath the Eurasian plate along the Japan Trench. This process began during the Early Miocene, ending in the Middle Miocene. By the late Pliocene the tectonic regime changed to compression, probably associated with collision between the Izu–Bonin Arc and Honshu. This led to reactivation of the rift faults in reverse sense, combined with inversion of the basins formed by these faults. Currently Japan is situated on the convergent boundaries between the Pacific, Philippine Sea, North American and Eurasian Plates. Along the island arc's east and southeast coasts, subduction of the Pacific and Philippine Sea plates occurs at the Japan Trench and Nankai Trough, respectively. The west coast of Honshu, bordering the Sea of Japan, is a north–south trending convergent boundary between the Eurasian and North American Plates. It has been proposed that it is an incipient subduction zone, consisting of eastward-dipping thrust faults.
The rifting and subsequent inversion has created a series of faults along the coast that have the potential to move and cause earthquakes, in the range of Mw6.8–7.9, in many cases with tsunamis. Major earthquakes and tsunamis along this boundary occurred in 1833, 1940, 1964, 1983 and 1993. The largest and most destructive tsunami in the Sea of Japan occurred in 1741 and was attributed to the eruption of Oshima. A fault known as the F43 (in the list of 60 faults evaluated) reaches the seabed just north of the Noto peninsula trending WSW–ENE. This southeast-dipping fault, which consists of two segments with a combined length of 94.2 km (58.5 mi), has been judged to be capable of producing an earthquake of Mw7.6.
Earthquake swarm
The northeastern tip of the Noto Peninsula has been subject to an earthquake swarm for the last three years, with the largest earthquake being a MJMA 6.5 event that took place in May 2023. The 1 January 2024 mainshock was the strongest to hit the peninsula since records began in 1885.

The swarm began in December 2020 at depths greater than 15 km (9.3 mi) beneath the peninsula's northeast. By mid-March 2021, the earthquake swarm migrated to shallower depths above 15 km (9.3 mi). Most earthquakes after May 2021 occurred at 10–15 km (6.2–9.3 mi) depth. The Mw 7.5 earthquake occurring after the swarm was deemed "rare". The general understanding of earthquake swarms are that due to the high intensity in crustal fracturing, such areas experiencing them are unlikely to generate large earthquakes. The swarm may have been triggered by the intrusion of fluids at deeper depths in response to crustal deformation.
Fluid upwelling may be occurring beneath the peninsula as evidenced by a 70 mm (2.8 in) uplift of the surface above the swarm. Seismologists considered the swarm unexpected as the peninsula lacked active volcanic or geothermal features to produce high-pressure fluids that would promote such seismic activity. These fluids may have originated from the upper mantle and migrated upwards into the crust through faults. Lubricated by fluids, these faults began producing earthquakes. No direct connection between the swarm and mainshock has been established, however, the swarm may have induced stress on these faults as they moved.
Earthquake
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) reported a moment magnitude of 7.5 and a focal depth of 10 km (6.2 mi) for the earthquake. The Japan Meteorological Agency recorded a magnitude of MJMA 7.6. It was the largest earthquake to strike Ishikawa since at least 1885, and the largest to strike Mainland Japan since the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake.

The focal mechanism of the mainshock corresponded to shallow reverse faulting along a northeast-trending plane dipping northwest or southeast, happening along the convergent boundary between the Okhotsk Plate and Amurian Plate. A magnitude 5.8 foreshock struck four minutes before the mainshock, while a magnitude 6.2 aftershock struck nine minutes later. More than 1,200 aftershocks were recorded across a 100 km (62 mi) zone. At least seven of them registered a magnitude of 5.0 and above.
According to a finite fault model released by the USGS, the earthquake rupture extended over 160 km (99 mi) by 20 km (12 mi) from the southwestern Noto Peninsula to Sado Island along a southeast-dipping fault. Slip was mostly concentrated entirely beneath the peninsula. The zones of the largest slip occurred southwest of the hypocenter while little to no slip occurred on the segment offshore between the peninsula and island. The patch immediately southwest of the epicenter produced a displacement of 5.992 m (20 ft) beneath the peninsula's coast. Another zone of slip occurred further southwest beneath the same stretch of coastline, producing up to 6.030 m (20 ft) of slip beneath Motoichi. The fault likely ruptured towards the seafloor at the peninsula while little to no slip was observed on the seafloor between the peninsula and Sado Island. The entire rupture process took about 50 seconds with the greatest phase of seismic moment release occurring some 25 seconds after initiation.
Due to the lack of significant slip on the segment offshore between the peninsula and Sado Island, seismologist Kenji Satake said there is still potential for another magnitude 7.0 or larger earthquake and tsunami. Research led by Kimiyuki Asano at the Disaster Prevention Research Institute at Kyoto University analysed waveforms recorded by seismometers and determined the earthquake consisted of two subevents. The first subevent, measuring MJMA 7.3, ruptured a fault beneath the peninsula, causing coastal uplift. A second subevent identical in magnitude ruptured the offshore segment 13 seconds after the completion of the first subevent.

Ground effects
About 85 km (53 mi) of coastline spanning Suzu, Wajima and Shika was raised and the shore moved seawards by up to 200 m (660 ft). Wajima's Minazuki Bay was uplifted 4 m (13 ft) while at Nagahashimachi's fishing port, a tide gauge was rendered unusable because the seafloor was exposed.
The Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) said parts of the country moved up to 1.3 m (4 ft 3 in) westwards with the maximum displacement observed at Wajima due to crustal deformation. At Anamizu, land shifted 1 m (3 ft 3 in) westwards. However, the agency said these movements could be slope or local ground movement instead. The agency also added that crustal uplift of 4 m (13 ft) occurred in western Wajima and 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in) in northern Suzu. Near Wajima's port, the shoreline of a sandy beach was moved 250 m (820 ft) seawards due to the coastal uplift. Uplift at Kaiso Fishing Port in Wajima by 4 m (13 ft) exposed parts of the seafloor.
The coastline in the Kawaura district of Suzu moved 175 m (574 ft) seawards due to the coastal uplift, while the land area expanded by a total of 2.4 km2 (0.93 sq mi). A port in the Ozawa district of Wajima was entirely drained. A seaward movement of 240 m (790 ft) was detected in the coasts of Monzenmachi and Kuroshimamachi districts in Wajima, as well as an expansion of 4.4 km2 (1.7 sq mi) in the Noto Peninsula. Areas in the northern part of the peninsula were also found to have risen while the southern sections, particularly in Anamizu, had subsided.

The GSI said due to the land expansion by 4.4 km2 (1.7 sq mi), Ishikawa Prefecture may have become larger than Fukui Prefecture in land area. The latter, having an area of 4,190.54 km2 (1,617.98 sq mi), is 4.34 km2 (1.68 sq mi) larger than Ishikawa Prefecture, according to a survey in October 2023. However, this difference was expected to be temporary due to the effects of coastal erosion. It has been theorized that the coastal uplift may have fortuitously lessened the effects of the tsunami which followed the earthquake.
Across the mountainous region of the peninsula, landslides were widespread. There were also extensive slope failures, particularly in the northeastern part of the peninsula. The number of landslides was estimated at 1,000. At least nine landslide dams were discovered in the Wajima area on 9 January, which had the potential to cause debris avalanches. In Wajima, a landslide dam caused water to overflow downstream into fields, potentially causing a collapse. In Jōetsu, Niigata, a landslide measuring 16,000 m3 (570,000 cu ft) buried a section of National Route 8.
A scarp trending east–west across a zone 4 km (2.5 mi) long and 0.1–0.4 km (0.062–0.249 mi) wide occurred along the Wakayama River in Suzu. The maximum vertical offset was 2.2 m (7 ft 3 in) in Naka district, Wakayama town. These scarps did not display any observable horizontal displacement. It propagated through and displaced rice fields, roads and rivers among other features. The GSI said these scarps may represent a fold in response to compressive forces due to the geology of the area. However, they did not rule out the scarp being the toe of a landslide, though this is a less probable explanation.

Surveys by the Japan Coast Guard revealed a section of uplifted seafloor south of the active fault trace. The seabed north of the Noto Peninsula lies 40–90 m (130–300 ft) beneath the sea. The recent survey and survey results from the previous year suggested a 3 m (9.8 ft) uplift of the seafloor.
Intensity
The Japan Meteorological Agency said it recorded a maximum seismic intensity of 7 (Shindo 7), the highest level on its seismic intensity scale, the first time that an earthquake of that intensity had been observed in the country since 2018. It corresponded to a maximum Modified Mercalli intensity of X–XI (Extreme). The USGS assigned a maximum intensity of IX (Violent). The maximum intensity was reported in Shika and Wajima, Ishikawa Prefecture. Intensity 6+ was recorded in Nanao, Suzu, Noto and Anamizu. Intensity 6– was recorded in Nagaoka in Niigata Prefecture and in Ishikawa's Nakanoto. The earthquake was also felt by residents in Tokyo and across the Kanto Region and as far as Aomori Prefecture in the northern tip of Honshu to Kyushu in the south of the country. A peak ground acceleration of 2,826 gal was observed in Shika, which was close to that recorded during the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake which measured 2,934 gal. Due to the ground beneath Wajima and Anamizu comprising soft sediments, ground motions were amplified. However, the amplification was strongly influenced by soil softening processes directly caused by the strong shaking. This also affected the observed intensity in Anamizu, Wajima, Monzen, and Noto Island.
Long period ground motion
The JMA also reported that the Noto Region of Ishikawa Prefecture registered the highest possible Long Period Ground Motion (LPGM) intensity of 4.
Aftershocks
The earthquake generated aftershocks that extended 160 km (99 mi) along a northeast–southwest trend. The largest aftershocks were recorded beneath the peninsula. About 15 minutes after the mainshock, a Mw 6.1 event was recorded. Two Mw 6.2 and 6.0 aftershocks were recorded on 9 January and 1 June, respectively.
Tsunami
Japan
Large parts of Japan's western coast, from Hokkaido to Nagasaki Prefectures were immediately placed under a tsunami warning after the earthquake struck, with evacuation orders issued in Ishikawa, Niigata, Toyama, and Yamagata prefectures. The earthquake triggered a major tsunami warning, the first one since the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake. Public broadcaster NHK said tsunami waves of 5 m (16 ft) could be expected. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center said dangerous tsunami waves were possible within 300 km (190 mi) of the epicenter.
The evacuation orders covered 62,000 people, with 1,000 evacuees finding shelter at the Japan Air Self-Defense Force base in Wajima in Ishikawa Prefecture. The major tsunami warning was later downgraded to a tsunami warning at 20:30, about four hours after the earthquake. These tsunami warnings were later downgraded to advisories, which were eventually lifted at 10:00 on 2 January, about 18 hours after the earthquake.
On the peninsula's northern coast, about 370 hectares of land was inundated. The first waves were reported to have arrived at around 16:21, although a team of researchers from Tohoku University's International Research Institute of Disaster Science said the first waves reached the Noto Peninsula within a minute of the earthquake. Along the Noto Peninsula, the second wave was the largest and most destructive. In Suzu, the first waves were estimated to arrive one minute after the shock and two minutes later at Nanao. They also estimated Toyama was struck by the waves in about five minutes. The quicker-than-anticipated tsunami arrival meant people did not evacuate in time. Fumihiko Imamura, a member of the research team, said it may have been due to the close proximity of the fault to the coast or a possible submarine landslide in Toyama Bay. Tsunamis in the Sea of Japan have been observed to arrive faster than those along Japan's Pacific coast. Tsunami modelling executed by the University of Tokyo and Building Research Institute of Japan computed the tsunami to be 3.6 m (12 ft) in Suzu; 3 m (9.8 ft) in Noto; 2.5 m (8 ft 2 in) in Shika and 2 m (6 ft 7 in) in Jōetsu, Niigata.
Flooding by the tsunami exceeded 4 m (13 ft) along the east and western part of the peninsula. In Suzu, the highest waves exceeded 4.7 m (15 ft) at Misaki Town, destroying homes and damaging the seawall. At Shika's Kagami area, the tsunami was recorded at 5.1 m (17 ft). The highest tsunami was measured in Monzenmachi Kuroshima at Wajima with a run up height of 11.3 m (37 ft). This measurement was recorded from fishing gear and other marine debris swept onto a hill. A run-up of about 4.2 m (14 ft) was estimated at Shika based on the survey of warehouses and port facilities. Aerial photographs of Suzu suggested a wave height of 3 m (9.8 ft) above sea level; subsequent analysis indicated a wave of 4.5 m (15 ft) at Nanba, Misakimachi. Tsunami waves exceeding 1.2 m (4 ft) struck Wajima, however data from the tide gauge was incomplete as it was one of several tide gauges across the peninsula that stopped receiving information shortly after. A tide gauge at the Shika Nuclear Power Plant recorded a rise of 3 m (9.8 ft) in tide level at between 17:45 and 18:00. The plant's operator later said that a 4 m (13 ft) wave reached the facility, which was built at an elevation of 11 m (36 ft) above sea level and had a seawall measuring 4 m (13 ft) high, at 17:45, without causing damage.
A tsunami measuring 90 cm (35 in) struck Kanazawa, while a tsunami of 80 cm (31 in) struck Toyama Prefecture and Sakata, Yamagata Prefecture. Waves measuring 50 cm (20 in) were recorded in Nanao and Tsuruga while waves measuring 40 cm (16 in) were recorded at Kashiwazaki, Tobishima, and Sado Island. In Toyama city, a 0.5 m (1 ft 8 in) wave was reported. The tsunami was recorded in Tottori Prefecture with heights of 0.6 m (2 ft 0 in) in Sakaiminato and 0.2 m (7.9 in) in Iwami; in Toyooka, Hyōgo Prefecture, it reached 0.4 m (1 ft 4 in). A 0.4 m (1 ft 4 in) tsunami was recorded at the port area of Maizuru, Kyoto Prefecture. In Hokkaido, waves of up to 60 cm (24 in) were reported in Setana, while 50 cm (20 in) waves struck Okushiri Island.
At Funami Park, a public park 600 m (2,000 ft) from the Seki River mouth in Jōetsu, the tsunami had a height of 7.45 m (24.4 ft), the highest recorded in Niigata Prefecture. The tsunami swept people away at the entrance of a building and in the park. The locally high waves may be attributed to the seafloor bathymetry concentrating the tsunami at a specific location. Video footage in Jōetsu, Niigata showed the tsunami approaching the rivermouth at 16:35, crashing into embankments and causing seawater to overflow. Evidence of tsunami sediments and marine flora suggested the tsunami reached at least 5.5 km (3.4 mi) upstream from the river mouth. It also flowed along the Hokura River for 1.6 km (0.99 mi) starting from its confluence at the Seki River. Wave heights along the coast southwest of the rivermouth were between 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) and 5.0 m (16.4 ft). Northeast of the rivermouth, they ranged from 1.8 m (5 ft 11 in) to 4.0 m (13.1 ft). At Naoetsu beach, tsunami debris indicated 2 m (6 ft 7 in) waves struck while 3 km (1.9 mi) to the west in Tanhama beach, waves were estimated at 4 m (13 ft).
Damage
In northeastern Suzu, the tsunami was said to have arrived a minute following the earthquake. Homes were washed off their foundations and some were driven further inland. At least two people were killed by the tsunami in Ukai Horyumachi District, however the total tsunami death toll may have been at least 26 including 24 in Ukai Horyumachi. The tsunami in Ukai Horyumachi reached up to 5.45 m (17.9 ft) and almost every building in the town within a block of the coast was swept away or damaged beyond repair. The combined effects of the earthquake and tsunami damaged or destroyed 90 percent of the town's buildings. In Suzu City, many fishing vessels capsized or were carried onto land. Building collapses and overturned cars were observed from a news helicopter flyover of the city. A resident recalled tsunami waves washing over a road, picking up cars and debris. Ishikawa Prefecture's governor, Hiroshi Hase, said the tsunami flooded the Iida Port area by up to 100 m (330 ft) inland. A study conducted by professor Shunichi Koshimura of Tohoku University found that the damage in Suzu was exacerbated by the seabed terrain of Toyama Bay.
In Shika, the tsunami waves reached the port at 17:40; it had a 4.2 m (14 ft) run-up and the fishing port. Tsunami observations in the peninsula were made difficult by the coastal uplift raising parts of the coast by up to 4.1 m (13 ft) and extending the coastline further seawards.
In the Shiromaru area of Noto, homes were destroyed and a fire was started. About 4.6 ha (11 acres) of coastline was damaged. The tsunami in Shiromaru reached 5.58 m (18.3 ft), one of the highest run ups recorded in the peninsula. Heavy damage was recorded in the district with many houses swept away or destroyed. Most coastal homes that weren't destroyed were damaged beyond repair and later demolished. Out of 80 occupied households in Shiromaru, 60 were severely damaged by the tsunami and fires.
On Hegurajima, the tsunami swept away homes and disabled basic services. Three people were stranded on the island prior to rescue two weeks later. A run-up of 6.28 m (20.6 ft) on the island was determined, one of the highest recorded in Ishikawa Prefecture. In Kurikawashiri, Noto, inundation was observed 700 m (2,300 ft) inland.
Misaki Town, in Suzu City, had one of the highest recorded run up on the Noto Peninsula. Located on the tip of the peninsula, close to the rupture, waves up to 5.64 m (18.5 ft) washed away several waterfront homes. Despite severe coastal damage and high run ups, no injuries or fatalities from the tsunami were recorded in Misaki. Extensive evacuation drills that had taken place multiple times a year in Misaki since the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, saved lives when the Noto tsunami hit.
In Monzenmachi Kuroshima, Wajima City, a maximum run up of 11.3 m (37 ft) was recorded. Despite the much higher waves than areas on the coast of Suzu City, tsunami damage in the Wajima region was comparatively light. This is because communities built along the West coast of the peninsula are built on stepped hills, with almost all buildings a notable distance above sea level. The regions with the highest run up also have a much lower population than the flat plains that the tsunami damaged towns on the East Coast of the peninsula are built on. The East coast also does not have significant sea defenses.
In Jōetsu, Niigata, the locally-high run-up exceeding 7 m (23 ft) flooded 15 homes along the Seki River bank. Beach houses and other buildings were also swept away. Ten fishing vessels capsized in the Ogata Fishing Port area. Containers were also washed away and warehouses storing machinery were flooded. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) assessed that the tsunami inundated up to 190 ha (470 acres) of land in Suzu, Noto and Shika, and damaged breakwaters in at least seven beaches. At least 120 maritime vessels were reported to have been sunk or capsized from the tsunami, while at least 70 percent of ports in Ishikawa Prefecture sustained damage. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said that 60 out of 69 fishing ports in Ishikawa Prefecture were affected by the tsunami, 18 of which were completely unusable and nine others partially functional.
Elsewhere along the Sea of Japan
The Korea Meteorological Administration warned that the coastlines of Gangwon Province and Pohang in South Korea could experience a rise in sea levels. Waves of 0.3 m (1 ft) were anticipated along the nation's east coast from 18:29 to 19:17 local time. A 0.45 m (1 ft 6 in) tsunami was later reported to have occurred in Gangwon. A 0.85 m (3 ft) wave reportedly struck Mukho at around 20:00 local time. Tsunamis with heights of 0.66 m (2 ft 2 in) were recorded in Uljin; 0.45 m (1 ft 6 in) in Sokcho and 0.39 m (1 ft 3 in) in Gangneung. It is thought to be the first tsunami of over 0.5 m (1 ft 8 in) observed in the country since 1993. According to Yonhap News Agency, citing North Korean state radio, a tsunami warning was issued with waves of 2.08 m (6 ft 10 in) potentially hitting the country's east coast.
Warnings were also issued in Russia for tsunami waves estimated to reach 1 m (3 ft), particularly along the west coast of Sakhalin Island, where evacuations were said to be conducted, although Russia later said that no evacuations were taking place there. Tsunami warnings were also declared in parts of Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Vladivostok and Nakhodka. The Emergencies Ministry of Russia said "response teams are ready to deal with the possible consequences of a tsunami." Officials in Vladivostok later said "no tsunami was observed" while in Nakhodka, "the tsunami passed almost unnoticed." A 0.63 m (2 ft 1 in) wave was observed at Preobrazhenie in Primorsky Krai; at Kholmsk, it measured 0.18 m (7.1 in).
Casualties
The earthquake killed 732 people, including 504 people who died in the aftermath. A majority of direct deaths were due to collapsed homes. At least 718 deaths were confirmed in Ishikawa Prefecture, including 248 in Wajima, 192 in Suzu, 87 in Noto, 84 in Nanao, 57 in Anamizu, 28 in Shika, 7 in Hakui, 6 in Uchinada, 3 in Nakanoto, and 1 each in Kanazawa, Hakusan and Komatsu. Eight people died in Toyama Prefecture: 4 in Himi, 2 in Takaoka and 1 each in Toyama City and Imizu. Six more died in Niigata Prefecture: four in Niigata City and two in Jōetsu. Additionally, there were 25 deaths from landslides and two more were killed by the tsunami, although the total number of tsunami deaths may be 26.
At least 1,277 people were injured in Ishikawa, 401 of them seriously, and as of 30 April 2026, two people remained missing. Information provided by the National Police Agency following autopsies found that 92 of the victims were crushed to death, 49 died of suffocation or respiratory failure, 32 died from hypothermia, and three died of burns. Many of those killed were the elderly.
By June 2024, there were 233 applications to local cities and towns to review deaths and register them as disaster-related. Three meetings have been held as of June 2024; the first meeting in May resulted in 30 new cases being registered as related deaths. On 18 June, city officials were recommended to certify 22 new deaths. On 25 June, a joint panel discussion by the Ishikawa prefectural government and town officials recommended that 18 additional deaths be registered as disaster-related. If these additional cases are certified, it would bring the projected total death toll to 299. Five more applications read on the same day were subjected to further review.
In an assessment of 115 indirect deaths released in December 2024, "distress after the earthquake and fear of aftershocks" was cited as the cause in 89 fatalities, followed by "severed lifelines such as electricity and water" at 53 cases, and "life in evacuation centers" at 37 cases; 200 additional cases were still subject to review.
Impact
The Japanese government estimated the total cost of damage in Ishikawa, Toyama and Niigata to be ¥1.1-2.6 trillion (US$7.4-17.6 billion). Most of the cost was attributed to damaged homes, roads, ports and other infrastructure. Ishikawa Prefecture alone accounted for between ¥0.9–1.3 trillion (US$5.7–8.3 billion). Damage was especially severe in Wajima and Suzu. At least 780 people across 30 districts in remote villages were isolated due to damaged roads and landslides and required helicopters to be reached. Many of the collapsed houses in Wajima were traditional wooden structures that were built prior to current building regulations that were imposed in 1981, which was equivalent to around 56.4 percent of the town's buildings. Information from 2018 also revealed that more than half of buildings in Wajima did not follow these regulations. In Suzu, many buildings were built before the enactment of modern building codes in 1950, while in 2019, only 51 percent of the town's houses were deemed earthquake-resistant, compared with 87 percent for the entire country. Around 66 percent of residences in Suzu were wooden homes that were built before 1980, while 61 percent of buildings in Noto were found to have been built before 1981.
At least 155,160 structures, including 116,615 houses, 443 public buildings and 38,102 of unspecified use, were damaged across Ishikawa, including 24,891 which were partially or completely destroyed. In Wajima, 6,282 homes were fully or partially destroyed and 4,352 others were damaged, along with 11,709 buildings. Ninety percent of the fatalities there were attributed to falling debris from collapsed houses. A fire occurred in the city at around 17:00. Due to damaged roads, firefighters were unable to extinguish the flames. The fire consumed an estimated 200 buildings, including many homes, and the Asaichi morning market, a 1,000-year-old shopping district and tourist attraction that hosted about 200 stalls. An area of up to 48,000 m2 (520,000 sq ft) was affected by the fire, which experts said was exacerbated by the loss of water supply and the tsunami warning, which prevented firefighters from responding immediately to the blaze. The Fire and Disaster Management Agency later said that the fire may have been caused by electrical wiring that had been damaged by the earthquake. At least 518 people were injured in the city. In Suzu, there were 252 injuries and up to 90 percent of the buildings were affected. In the city, 3,871 homes were severely damaged or destroyed and 1,748 were partially damaged. Fires also caused severe damage to many buildings. Damage and casualties in the city were exacerbated by previous earthquakes, most notably a MJMA6.5 event in May 2023 which damaged or destroyed a quarter of Suzu's houses. Many people were still residing in these damaged houses at the time of the earthquake. The mayor of Suzu said about 4,000 to 5,000 households of the city's 6,000 were no longer habitable, adding that damage was "catastrophic".
The Ishikawa Nanao Police Station said collapsed homes trapped people before they were rescued. A spokesperson at Wajima Municipal Hospital said people had broken bones or were injured by falling objects. At least 116 people were injured and 7,462 houses in Shika were damaged, including 3,032 which collapsed or sustained severe damage. In Anamizu, 258 people were injured, 387 houses collapsed, 1,289 were partially destroyed and 1,647 were damaged; a landslide in the town killed 16 people and destroyed three houses.
In Noto, 58 people were injured, 1,319 homes were completely or partially destroyed and 4,512 others were damaged, along with 4,215 buildings. Five of the affected houses were destroyed by fires. The tsunami also washed debris onto streets. Operations of the Noto Airport were suspended after five cracks as long as 10 m (33 ft) appeared on the runway; the terminal of the airport also sustained damage. Access roads leading to the airport were blocked, while about 500 passengers were left stranded inside the facility, which was expected to be closed until 4 January. Access to the northern part of the Noto Peninsula was limited by a damaged road. In Nanao, 39 people were injured, 5,616 houses fully or partially collapsed and 11,504 others were damaged. Noto Island was isolated after the bridge linking it to the town was closed. In Kanazawa, nine people were injured and 20,667 buildings were damaged, including 285 which collapsed or sustained severe damage.
In Niigata Prefecture, six people were killed, 60 others were injured, 4,271 buildings collapsed or were badly affected and 21,192 others were partially damaged, with 18,814 homes affected in Niigata City alone; 44 areas of Nishi Ward had liquefaction reported. On Sado Island, four buildings were razed, 31 were partially destroyed and 482 were damaged. In Toyama Prefecture, eight people were killed, and 58 others were injured, 14 of them seriously. Eight of the injuries occurred after the ceiling of a pachinko parlor collapsed in Toyama City. Two residents of the prefecture were also killed in Ishikawa. At least 1,066 houses collapsed or were severely damaged and 21,748 others were partially damaged, mostly in the cities of Himi, Takaoka and Imizu. In Fukui Prefecture, six people sustained minor injuries, 12 houses partially collapsed and 830 others were damaged, including 45 in Awara. Five injuries were also reported in Osaka, two in Hyōgo, and one each in Gifu and Aichi. In Nagano Prefecture, 21 houses were damaged.